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 Abstract : In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision, FTC v. 
Actavis, in which it ordered the lower courts to apply the rule of reason to 
“reverse payment settlement agreements.” As the leading jurisdiction for 
antitrust and intellectual property laws, the United States is once again poised 
to influence foreign jurisdictions on the issue of reverse payment settlement 
agreements. In this context, South Korea presents a ripe opportunity for a 
comparative study because it recently adopted a patent-approval linkage system 
under which reverse payment settlement agreements will likely become a 
contentious issue. In particular, the South Korean Supreme Court’s recent case, 
GlaxoSmithKline v. Korea Fair Trade Commission, offers valuable insight into 
how Korean courts will likely approach this issue. This Comment contends that 
the U.S. case law, including Actavis, offers important insights for the Korean 
legal community and that Korea’s experiment has potential to offering a fresh 
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On June 16, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark antitrust 
decision in Federal Trade Commission (FTC) v. Actavis, Inc., settling a 
circuit split on the issue of “reverse payment settlement agreements.”1 The 
Court held that such agreements should be scrutinized under the “rule of 
reason” analysis instead of being analyzed under the “scope of the patent” 
test.2 After settling the split, the Court remanded the case to be tried under 
the rule of reason analysis.3 Interestingly, the Court did not spell out the 
level of strictness that should be applied under the rule of reason analysis: 
“We therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-
of-reason antitrust litigation.”4 
This Comment analyzes the Court’s holding, which shifts the balance 
from the scope of the patent test to the rule of reason analysis, and 
examines the potential impact that this shift will have in the development 
of antitrust law in South Korea. This study is important for two reasons. 
First, because U.S. antitrust law is highly developed and more advanced 
than that of many other nations, key decisions by U.S. antitrust agencies 
and courts can influence foreign jurisdictions.5 Second, the issue of reverse 
payment settlement agreements is gaining significant attention from 
 
 1 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2223–47 (2013). Reverse payment settlement agreements 
arise under the context of the Federal Drug Administration’s Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA) regime of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355. ANDA was originally intended to 
encourage the expedited entry of generic drugs into the brand-name drug company market by allowing 
generics to refer to the original drug company’s safety and efficacy data during the application process. 
See infra Part II(A). However, after the filing of an ANDA and the ensuing patent litigation, in practice 
the original drug company agrees to pay the generic drug company to stay out of the market. Id. These 
agreements are referred to as “reverse payment settlement agreements” and may also be referred to as 
“pay-for-delay” or “pay-to-delay” agreements. Shannon U. Han, Pay-to-Delay Settlements: The Circuit-
Splitting Headache Plaguing Big Pharma, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 913, 914 (2013); Marlee P. 
Kutcher, Comment, Waiting is the Hardest Part: Why the Supreme Court Should Adopt the Third 
Circuit’s Analysis of Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agreements, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1093, 1095 (2013). 
 2 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237. The scope of the patent test adopted by the Second 
Circuit presumes that the patent holder has the right to monopolize the market and to settle patent 
litigation unless the litigation is a sham or baseless. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 
187, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2006). Under the rule of reason analysis, the court balances the procompetitive 
efficiency generated by an agreement and weighs it against the anticompetitive effects. See infra Part 
III(A). Rule of reason analysis is an alternative to the “per se” rule, which holds price-fixing agreements 
as per se illegal. Id. 
 3 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2238. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See David J. Gerber, Competition Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 263, 270 (2002) (“U.S. antitrust has 
occupied the center of the competition law universe. It is the competition law to which others have 
looked and about which others have generally known more than they have known about other 
competition law systems. Although I have shown elsewhere that its influence has not always been as 
direct and straightforward as many have assumed, it has frequently played a ‘model’ role for 
decisionmakers in other systems.”). 
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scholars and practitioners in the fields of intellectual property and antitrust 
laws in South Korea. Such heightened interest most likely arose from the 
introduction of the patent-approval linkage system into Korea’s 
pharmaceutical laws and a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Korea that addressed a similar issue to the one in Actavis. 
Scholars have written articles in Korean law journals comparing Actavis to 
the recent Korean case, and leading law firms have published their 
forecasts of a patent–approval linkage system on Korea’s pharmaceutical 
industry. This Comment surveys these legal developments in South Korea 
and attempts to answer the following questions that arise in this context. 
First, why is Korea adopting a patent–approval linkage system that 
mimics the Hatch–Waxman Act and thereby creating an incentive structure 
that accommodates reverse payment settlement agreements similar to the 
United States? Second, what can we learn from the GlaxoSmithKline v. 
Korea Fair Trade Commission case6 regarding the Korean judiciary’s 
stance on reverse payment settlement agreements? Third, what can Korea 
learn from the U.S. experience on reverse payment settlement agreements? 
Particularly, what can Korea learn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Actavis and from the circuit splits that led to the Supreme 
Court’s decision? 
Regarding the first question, this Comment argues that there is a 
plausible explanation for Korea’s adaptation of a regulatory structure 
similar to that of the Hatch–Waxman Act. Korea’s regulatory agencies may 
be making a strategic choice to import a working pharmaceutical regulatory 
framework that balances the goals of patent laws and antitrust laws because 
a functioning regulatory framework is worth the risk of having to deal with 
reverse payment settlement issues. On the second question, this Comment 
explores the two decisions’ similarities and differences. Specifically that, 
while on its face the GlaxoSmithKline court appears to confuse the rule of 
reason analysis and the scope of the patent test,7 the two courts’ similar 
analyses are the result of independent legal reasoning under different legal 
systems. This Comment further asserts that the Actavis decision offers a 
preview of how Korean courts will likely decide reverse payment 
settlement agreements when they arise under the impending regulatory 
framework. Lastly, this Comment argues that the case law on reverse 
payment settlement agreements that has developed in the United States 
over the past twelve years, particularly the Actavis decision, offers a wealth 
of legal reasoning that could be useful for Korean regulatory agencies and 
courts. Building off of these resources will allow Korean agencies and 
courts to reach better decisions and allow Korean practitioners to put forth 
 
 6 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Du24498, Feb. 27, 2014 (S. Kor.). 
 7 As some Korean experts have argued, the issue in the GSK decision could have been easily 
decided by applying the scope of the patent test. See infra Part III(B)(5). 
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the most persuasive arguments in these matters. 
In order to achieve these objectives, this Comment proceeds in the 
following order. First, Part II provides the statutory framework of the 
reverse payment settlement agreements and the conflicting circuit court 
splits leading up to Actavis. Part II also examines the Court’s legal 
reasoning used in Actavis. Part III analyzes the decision’s significance in 
U.S. domestic jurisdictions, especially regarding how lower courts will 
develop and refine the rule of reason analysis. This portion is important 
because Actavis is a U.S. case, and to understand it properly, one must 
understand the case’s impact in the United States. Additionally, Part III 
examines the GlaxoSmithKline case and the recent proposal for a patent–
approval linkage system in South Korea. It also addresses and answers the 
questions presented above. Finally, Part IV summarizes the findings and 




In order to set up the context for the analysis that will appear in Part 
III, this Part introduces the following topics that will facilitate the reader’s 
understanding of reverse payment settlement agreements. Subpart A 
provides the statutory framework of the Hatch–Waxman Act under which 
the issue of reverse payment settlement agreements arose. Subpart B 
highlights the importance of the 180-day exclusive marketing period, 
which was provided in the Hatch–Waxman Act as a key factor to 
incentivize parties to enter into reverse payment settlement agreements. 
Subpart C provides a brief survey of the conflicting circuit court decisions 
that led up to the Actavis decision. Finally, subpart D examines the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning and holding in the Actavis decision. 
 
A. Statutory Framework Under the Hatch–Waxman Act. 
 
This subpart introduces the statutory framework under which reverse 
payment settlement agreements came into existence. Reverse payment 
settlement agreements arose under the drug regulatory framework created 
by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
better known as the Hatch–Waxman Act.8 Under the Hatch–Waxman Act, 
a pioneering drug company that develops an innovative drug must file for a 
New Drug Application (NDA) with the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in order to receive marketing approval.9 Obtaining a 
NDA approval is a burdensome and costly process, and pioneering drug 
 
 8 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch–Waxman Act), 21 
U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006). 
 9 Id. § 355(b). 
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companies invest significant resources to gain such approvals for their 
innovative drugs.10 
In order to foster competition and drive drug prices closer to the 
market price, Congress included the Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA) process in the Hatch–Waxman Act that encourages the market 
entry of generic-drug companies.11 Under the ANDA process, once the 
pioneering drug company has obtained marketing approval through a NDA, 
a generic-drug company may apply for an ANDA with the FDA to obtain 
marketing approval for its generic version of a brand-name drug.12 An 
important aspect of the ANDA is that, if the ANDA is approved, the first-
to-file applicant of an ANDA is given a 180-day exclusive marketing 
period for its generic version of the drug before other generic-drug 
companies may enter the market.13 
In order to file an ANDA, the generic-drug company must certify that 
its drug has the same active ingredients and is biologically equivalent to the 
original brand-name drug.14 Because such certification induces patent 
infringement, the Hatch–Waxman Act specifies how the parties will 
identify and resolve potential patent conflict. First, the pioneering drug 
manufacturer must list the “number and the expiration date of any 
[relevant] patent” in the NDA.15 Second, the ANDA applicant must assure 
the FDA that its generic version of the drug will not infringe on the brand-
name manufacturer’s patent using one of the following four methods: (i) 
certifying that the brand-name manufacturer has not listed any relevant 
patents; (ii) certifying that any relevant patents have expired; (iii) 
requesting approval of marketing when relevant patents expire; or (iv) 
certifying that any listed, relevant patent “is invalid or will not be infringed 
 
 10  See FDA Drug Approval Process Infographic, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm295473.htm (last updated Apr. 25, 2014) 
(indicating that drug companies must complete preclinical animal testing and three phases of clinical 
tests involving humans before filing a NDA); see also Matthew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New 
Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big Pharma to Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013, 11:10 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-
drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/ (“A company hoping to get a single drug to market can expect 
to have spent $350 million before the medicine is available for sale. In part because so many drugs fail, 
large pharmaceutical companies that are working on dozens of drug projects at once spend $5 billion 
per new medicine.”). 
 11  See H.R. REP. NO. 98–857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984) (“The purpose of Title I of the bill is to make 
available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure for pioneer 
drugs first approved after 1962.”); see also Alicia I. Hogges-Thomas, Winning the War on Drug Prices: 
Analyzing Reverse Payment Settlements Through the Lens of Trinko, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1421, 1425 
(2013). 
 12  21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
 13  Id. § 355(j)(5). 
 14  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv). 
 15  Id. § 355(b)(1). 
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by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the drug described in the ANDA.16 The 
fourth option, known as the “Paragraph IV” or “ANDA IV” certification, 
amounts to a generic-drug company’s challenge to the pioneering drug 
company’s patents and is treated as an automatic infringement of the 
latter’s patent rights.17 
After a generic-drug company files a Paragraph IV certification, if the 
brand-name patentee brings a patent infringement lawsuit within forty-five 
days, the FDA must withhold approving the generic drug for a thirty-month 
period while the disputing parties resolve the patent lawsuit.18 If the patent 
litigation is decided during this period, the FDA follows the decision of the 
court.19 If, however, the patent litigation is not concluded by the end of the 
thirty-month period, the generic-drug company’s marketing is approved.20 
Reverse payment settlement agreements arise out of this situation. 
Instead of pursuing the litigation to the fullest extent, the parties settle with 
the understanding that the original-drug company will pay the generic-drug 
company a large sum of money in return for the generic’s assurance that it 
will not enter the market until a designated time.21 It is called reverse 
payment because normally, in patent litigation, one would expect the 
infringing party to pay a settlement amount to the patentee. The Supreme 
Court cited a noted antitrust scholar on this point: “Where only one party 
owns a patent, it is virtually unheard of outside of pharmaceuticals for that 
party to pay an accused infringer to settle the lawsuit.”22 However, in this 
case the patentee pays the alleged infringer in exchange for a promise to 
stay out of the market. 
 
B. Importance of the 180-Day Exclusive Marketing Rights. 
 
As noted above, the Hatch–Waxman Act includes an important 
exclusive marketing provision that sets up the incentives for parties to settle 
the patent lawsuit. Under the Act, the generic-drug company that was first 
to file an ANDA is entitled to a 180-day exclusive marketing period after 
the FDA’s marketing approval.23 Subsequent ANDA filers cannot market 
their drug until the 180-day exclusive marketing period has been 
exhausted.24 This 180-day period is an important incentive for generic-drug 
companies to enter the existing market because they can reap enormous 
 
 16  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). 
 17  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006). 
 18  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B). 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  See Kutcher, supra note 1, at 1102. 
 22  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235 (2013). 
 23  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5). 
 24  Id. 
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profit during the exclusive marketing period.25 However, the 180-day 
exclusivity “only goes to the first ANDA-IV filer,” and subsequent filers 
cannot get this privilege “even if the first ANDA-IV filer settles and the 
subsequent ANDA-IV filer succeeds in proving lack of infringement or 
patent invalidity.”26 Since the major incentive for challenging a patented 
drug under ANDA is the 180-day exclusivity period from which generics 
gain significant profit, if the possibility for getting the exclusivity reward is 
removed, generics are less incentivized to challenge the patent. Under this 
framework, “the agreement creates a bottleneck, in which no other generic 
can enter until the first ANDA filer’s exclusivity is used.”27 Therefore, 
when a brand-name-drug company pays the first ANDA filer to stay out of 
the market, it “prevents all other generic companies from entering the 
market for the duration of the settlement.”28 
This regulatory framework creates the following incentives for the 
original- and generic-drug companies. For the original-drug company, 
paying the first-to-file generic-drug company is a near guarantee to a 
monopoly during the settlement period.29 Losing the patent litigation, on 
the other hand, means a great loss in potential profit from the brand-name 
drug.30 Thus, the incentive to pay to delay the generic’s entry is immense 
for original-drug companies. For the first-to-file generic, losing the 
litigation maintains its status quo while winning the litigation presents the 
opportunity to reap substantial profits during the 180-day exclusive 
marketing period and beyond. As long as the original-drug manufacturer 
offers a reverse payment settlement amount similar to or greater than the 
generic-drug company’s expected profit for marketing the drug, they are 
incentivized to accept that offer. As a result, the 180-day exclusive 
marketing period granted only to the first-to-file generic gives incentives 
both to the brand-name-drug company and the generic-drug company to 
enter into a settlement. The unique regulatory framework that incentivizes 
reverse payment settlement agreements has spawned numerous litigations 
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which resulted in a circuit split 




 25  C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design 
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1578–79 (2006). 
 26  Alicia I. Hogges–Thomas, An American Drug Problem: Reclaiming Consumers’ Rights under the 
Hatch–Waxman Act, 37 VT. L. REV. 737, 741 (2013). “The 180-day reward is . . . not transferred to the 
next ANDA-IV filer.” Id. at 742. 
 27  Melanie J. Brown, Reverse Payment Settlements in the European Commission’s Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry Report: A Missed Opportunity to Benefit from U.S. Experience, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
377, 382 (2010). 
 28  Hogges–Thomas, supra note 26, at 742. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. 
4KIM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15 1:45 PM 
Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements 
35:377 (2015) 
385 
C. Circuit Split Leading Up to FTC v. Actavis. 
 
The FTC has long disfavored reverse payment settlement agreements 
for their potential anticompetitive effects and has launched numerous 
lawsuits in several U.S. jurisdictions that resulted in a marked split among 
the circuit courts.31 Prior to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari on this 
issue, there were three competing legal approaches to reverse payment 
settlement agreements: (1) the per se illegal rule, (2) the scope of the patent 
test, and (3) the rule of reason analysis.32 A recent comment offers a 
comprehensive summary of the cases that led to the circuit split on this 
issue.33 Since that work need not be repeated, only relevant highlights of 
these cases will be provided here. 
The D.C. Circuit decided the first case—applying the per se illegal 
test—in Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l.34 There, the 
plaintiff, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Andrx), argued that its reverse 
payment settlement agreement with a generic was lawful because “‘its 
conduct was not only permitted under but clearly contemplated by the 
Hatch–Waxman’ Amendments.”35 The court disagreed, stating that the 
agreement was a “manipulation of the exclusivity period trigger date [that] 
extended the legal bar.”36 Invoking the per se illegal rule, the court stated 
that “[t]o be ancillary, and hence exempt from the per se rule, an agreement 
eliminating competition must be subordinate and collateral to a separate, 
legitimate transaction . . . .”37 The court concluded that the agreements in 
question “were not necessarily ancillary restraints but rather could 
reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allocate market share and preserve 
monopolistic conditions.”38 Therefore, Biovail’s injury, according to the 
court, was the “type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.”39 
Another example of applying the per se illegal rule can be found in the 
Sixth Circuit case, In re Cardizem CD.40 In that case, the court analyzed the 
same agreement that at issue in Andrx Pharmaceuticals.41 The Sixth Circuit 
concurred with the D.C. Circuit and held that the agreement was “at its 
core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition . . . , a classic 
example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”42 The court cited as the key 
 
 31  Kutcher, supra note 1, at 1108–27. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. 
 34  See generally Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 35  Id. at 809. 
 36  Id. at 810. 
 37  Id. at 814–15. 
 38  Id. at 811. 
 39  Id. at 813. 
 40  See generally In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. at 908. 
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factor for its decision, the 180-day period of marketing exclusivity, which 
delayed the entry of all other competitors as well as the disproportionately 
large payment $89.83 million settlement that Hoescht Marion Roussel, Inc. 
paid Andrx to keep its generic product off the market.43 Thus, the earliest 
cases that addressed reverse payment settlement agreements condemned 
them as per se illegal. 
A separate line of cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit and the 
Second Circuit introduced the scope of the patent test.44 This test was 
considerably more lenient toward reverse payment settlement agreements 
because it shielded the agreements from antitrust scrutiny as long as they 
fell within the exclusionary potential of the patent.45 In Valley Drug Co., 
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s per se treatment of the 
reverse payment settlement agreement in question because it “failed to 
consider the exclusionary power of Abbott’s patent in its antitrust analysis 
. . . .”46 Because the terms of the agreement terminated when the patent in 
question expired, the court viewed that the effect of the agreement “appears 
to be no broader than the potential exclusionary effect of the [patent].”47 In 
light of this, the court expressed its concern that the antitrust scrutiny 
“would undermine the patent incentives” and “impair the incentives for 
disclosure and innovation.”48 In addition, because of the factual uncertainty 
of what was actually considered in the payment amount, “it [was] difficult 
to infer from the size of the payment alone that the [patent] infringement 
suits lacked merit.”49 Thus, the court held that “[w]hen the exclusionary 
power of a patent is implicated . . . , the antitrust analysis cannot ignore the 
scope of the patent exclusion.”50 
In Schering-Plough, the Eleventh Circuit expressed its view that 
“neither the rule of reason nor the per se analysis is appropriate in this 
context.”51 Both approaches were inappropriate “because they seek to 
determine whether the challenged conduct had an anticompetitive effect on 
the market” when by their nature “anticompetitive effect is already present” 
in a patent.52 The court clarified its rule stating, “the proper analysis of 
antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the scope of the 
exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements 
exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”53 Thus, the 
 
 43  Id. at 907. 
 44  Kutcher, supra note 1, at 1111–12. 
 45  Id. at 1114. 
 46  Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 47  Id. at 1305. 
 48  Id. at 1308. 
 49  Id. at 1310. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Schering–Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 52  Id. at 106566. 
 53  Id. at 1066. 
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Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of reverse payment settlement agreements was 
primarily geared towards protecting the patent holder’s rights as long as the 
agreement in question was within the scope of the patent. 
The Second Circuit in In re Tamoxifen embraced the scope of the 
patent test and made it more deferential.54 The court declined to adopt the 
per se rule for reverse payment settlement agreements because it “[did] not 
think that the fact that the patent holder is paying to protect its patent 
monopoly, without more, establishes a Sherman Act violation.”55 Instead, 
the court expressed that “[s]o long as the patent litigation is neither a sham 
nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement 
in order to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful 
monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the patented product.”56 
Thus, unless the plaintiff can establish that the underlying patent litigation 
was baseless, “even ‘excessive’ payments, to settle the dispute were 
therefore not necessarily unlawful.”57 Thus, this line of cases moved away 
from per se illegality of reverse payment settlement agreements and set a 
trend towards the more deferential scope of the patent test.58 This trend 
appeared to solidify when the Federal Circuit adopted the scope of the 
patent test in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride,59 “stressing the general 
public policy favoring patent litigation settlements . . . .”60 
In 2012, however, the Third Circuit split from this trend in In re K-
Dur and introduced the rule of reason to decide the issue of reverse 
payment settlement agreements.61 First, the court attacked the “scope of the 
patent test’s almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity” because 
such presumption “is intended merely as a procedural device and is not a 
substantive right of the patent holder.”62 In the context of ANDA IV 
litigation, “the underlying suit concerned patent infringement rather than 
patent validity.”63 Because the patent holder, rather than the challenger has 
the burden of showing the infringement in a patent infringement case, it 
would not make sense to apply the presumption of validity rule in an 
ANDA IV litigation.64 
The court further noted that, “in passing the Hatch–Waxman Act, 
Congress [wanted to draw] a careful line between patent protection and the 
need to provide incentives for competition in the pharmaceutical 
 
 54  Kutcher, supra note 1, at 1120. 
 55  In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 56  Id. at 208–09. 
 57  Id. at 213. 
 58  See Kutcher, supra note 1, at 1121. 
 59  See generally In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 60  Kutcher, supra note 1, at 1122. 
 61  See generally In re K–Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 62  Id. at 214. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. 
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industry.”65 This, according to the court, “strongly supports the application 
of rule of reason scrutiny of reverse payment settlements in the 
pharmaceutical industry.”66 The court ultimately remanded the case to the 
district court to apply “a quick look rule of reason analysis based on the 
economic realities of the reverse payment settlement . . . .”67 Under the 
“quick look” rule, the existence of a reverse payment settlement established 
“prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade . . . .”68 The 
defendants could rebut this “by showing that the payment (1) was for a 
purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-competitive 
benefit.”69 The Third Circuit’s decision adopting the quick look test, 
therefore, was the most lenient treatment of reverse payment settlement 
agreements, which collided with the approaches adopted by other circuit 
courts. 
Thus, the Third Circuit’s split generated competing theories on how to 
deal with reverse payment settlement agreements. Because of these 
divergent opinions among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to review the issue in FTC v. Actavis. 
 
D. A Review of FTC v. Actavis. 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in FTC v. Actavis—an Eleventh 
Circuit decision—to examine reverse payment settlement agreements for 
the first time. In Actavis, respondents, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, had filed a 
NDA for a brand-name drug called Androgel in 1999.70 In 2000, the 
application was approved by the FDA, and in 2003, Solvay secured the 
relevant patent and published the information with the FDA.71 After the 
patent information became public, Actavis filed an ANDA in the same year 
with the FDA to get marketing approval of its generic version of 
Androgel.72 Another generic-drug company, Paddock Laboratories, also 
filed a separate ANDA for its generic version of the drug.73 Par 
Pharmaceutical joined Actavis in the lawsuit, and both Actavis and 
Paddock certified under Paragraph IV that Solvay’s patent was “invalid or 
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of their generic 
version of Androgel.74 Solvay filed a patent infringement action against 
 
 65  Id. at 217. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. at 218. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
 70  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. at 2228–29. 
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Actavis and Paddock, and thirty months later, the FDA approved Actavis’s 
first-to-file application.75 
In 2006, however, all the parties involved in the patent litigation 
agreed to a settlement.76 Under the terms of the settlement, Actavis agreed 
not to enter the market with its generic product until August 31, 2015 and 
also agreed to promote Androgel to urologists.77 Paddock and Par 
Pharmaceutical also made similar promises.78 In return, Solvay agreed to 
pay $19–$30 million annually to Actavis for nine years, and $12 million 
and $60 million total to Paddock and Par respectively.79 Although the 
companies stated that the payment was made in consideration of the 
generic companies’ efforts to market Androgel, the FTC argued that the 
payment far exceeded the value of such services and was instead made as a 
condition for not entering the market monopolized by Androgel.80 The FTC 
filed suit against all four parties in 2009, alleging violation of § 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.81 The district court held “that these 
allegations did not set forth an antitrust law violation,” and accordingly 
dismissed the FTC’s complaint.82 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court holding, “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a 
reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its 
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of 
the patent.”83 The FTC sought certiorari because the court of appeals had 
reached different outcomes on the “application of the antitrust laws to 
Hatch–Waxman–related patent settlements . . . .”84 
The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly 
dismissed the complaint under the scope of the patent test without 
considering the applicability of antitrust laws to the case.85 In its opinion, 
the Court stated that while it concedes that the case may fall within the 
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, this characterization does 
not “immunize the agreement from antitrust attack.”86 “For one thing,” the 
Court said, “[t]he patent here may or may not be valid, and may or may not 
be infringed.”87 An invalidated patent does not carry the right to exclude 
 
 75  Id. at 2229. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. at 2229–30. 
 82  Id. at 2230. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 2230–31. 
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“all except its owner from the use of the protected process or product.”88 
According to the Court, “paragraph IV litigation in this case put the 
patent’s validity at issue, as well as its actual preclusive scope.”89 That 
litigation, as the Court emphasized, was inappropriately settled by the 
reverse payment settlement agreement.90 The Court noted the settlement 
was “unusual” and expressed its concern that “settlements taking this form 
tend to have significant adverse effects on competition.”91 Because of these 
reasons, “it would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by 
measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law 
policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust 
policies as well.”92 
Then the Court reviewed its own precedents, which “ma[de] clear that 
patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust 
laws.”93 In concluding the first part of the opinion, the Court evoked the 
statutory policy of the Hatch–Waxman Act by stating that “the general 
procompetitive thrust of the statute, its specific provisions facilitating 
challenges to a patent’s validity, . . . and its later-added provisions 
requiring parties to a patent dispute triggered by a paragraph IV filing to 
report settlement terms to the FTC and the [Department of Justice]” suggest 
a view contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s.94 The Court even cited Senator 
Hatch’s legislative testimony that “‘[i]t was and is very clear that the 
[Hatch–Waxman Act] was not designed to allow deals between brand and 
generic companies to delay competition.’”95 
In the second part of the opinion, the Court addressed the Eleventh 
Circuit’s concern that “antitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement 
would require the parties to [litigate the validity of the patent, which will 
prove] time-consuming, complex, and expensive.”96 The issue here was 
whether the “value of settlements and the patent litigation problem” 
outweighed the value of antitrust policy.97 Nevertheless, the Court 
concluded that “this patent-related factor should not determine the result 
here . . . [,]” but instead gave five reasons why “the FTC should have been 
given the opportunity to prove its antitrust claim.”98 
The first reason was that “the specific restraint at issue has the 
 
 88  Id. at 2231. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. at 2232. 
 94  Id. at 2234. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
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‘potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.’”99 The Court 
observed that the settlement at issue here “simply keeps prices at patentee-
set levels[,] . . . [while dividing] the benefit between the [challenged] 
patentee and the [patent] challenger,” resulting in the consumer’s loss.100 
The disproportionate settlement amount may “provide strong evidence that 
the patentee seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim 
with a share of its monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the 
competitive market.”101 
In addition, responding to the question of whether the high payment of 
a large reverse settlement amount invites other generics to challenge a 
patent, the Court pointed to the 180-day marketing exclusivity period.102 
Subsequent challengers do not get the benefit of the 180-day marketing 
exclusivity.103 Thus even if a subsequent challenger successfully challenges 
the original-drug company and invalidates the patent in question, this 
decision would not give the subsequent challenger the coveted exclusive 
marketing period and instead would allow all other generics to jump into 
the market.104 Thus, reverse payment settlement agreements with a first 
patent challenger can be an effective deterrent to all other challengers 
because it “‘removes from consideration the most motivated challenger, 
and the one closest to introducing competition.’”105 The Court thus noted 
that due to “Hatch–Waxman’s unique regulatory framework, including the 
special advantage that the 180-day exclusivity period gives to first filers, . . 
. the patentee’s ordinary incentives to resist paying off challengers . . . 
appear to be more frequently overcome.”106  
The second reason that the Court provided for why the FTC should be 
given an opportunity to prove its antitrust claim was that the 
“anticompetitive consequences [of reverse payment settlement agreements] 
will at least sometimes prove unjustified.”107 Although there were 
“offsetting or redeeming virtues” of reverse payment settlement 
agreements, the Court noted that such considerations do not justify 
dismissing the FTC’s complaint.108 Instead, the antitrust defendant can 
show “that legitimate justifications are present” and convince the court of 
the lawfulness of the agreement’s terms under the rule of reason.109 
The third reason provided by the Court was that, “where a reverse 
 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. at 2234–35. 
 101  Id. at 2235. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. at 2235–36. 
 108  Id. at 2236. 
 109  Id. 
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payment threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee 
likely has the power to bring that harm about in practice.”110 Again, the 
Court here noted that “[t]he size of the payment from a branded drug 
manufacturer to a generic challenger is itself a strong indicator of such 
power.”111 
The Court’s fourth reason was that “an antitrust action is likely to 
prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.”112 
Here, the Court addressed the Eleventh Circuit’s concern that it is 
“normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust 
question.”113 The Court first noted that “[a]n unexplained large reverse 
payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts 
about the patent’s survival . . . [,]”114 which “suggests that the payment’s 
objective is to maintain supracompetitive prices . . . ” and to “prevent the 
risk of competition.”115 The Court proposed a solution that “the size of the 
unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a 
patent’s weakness, all without forcing the court to conduct a detailed 
exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”116 
Lastly, in providing its fifth reason for why the FTC should be given 
an opportunity to prove its antitrust claim, the Court stated, “the fact that a 
large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent 
litigating parties from settling their lawsuit.”117 In other words, the Court 
observed that there are many other forms of settlements that a patent holder 
and challenger can work out such as “allowing the generic manufacturer to 
enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the 
patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”118 For the 
Court, the relevant antitrust question was involved the parties’ reasons for 
entering into reverse settlement payment agreements.119 If the reason was 
“a desire to maintain and to share patent-generated monopoly profits, then, 
in the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to 
forbid the arrangement.”120 Therefore, with the foregoing five reasons, the 
Court addressed the Eleventh Circuit’s concern regarding the cost of 
litigation and provided justification for why the FTC should at least be 
given a chance to prove its antitrust claim under the rule of reason. 
In the final section of the opinion, the Court rejected the FTC’s 
 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. at 2236–37. 
 117  Id. at 2237. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. 
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invitation to adopt the presumptive rule, or a quick look approach, because 
reverse payment settlement cases are too complex to be handled under this 
approach.121 Thus, the Court concluded, “the FTC must prove its case as in 
other rule-of-reason cases.”122 The Court mentioned that there is “a sliding 
scale in appraising reasonableness,’” and thus, “the quality of proof 
required should vary with the circumstances.”123 However, instead of 
offering a guideline for this inquiry, the Court said it would “leave to the 





In Part III, this Comment dives into a comparative analysis between 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Actavis case and a prominent South Korean case, 
GlaxoSmithKline v. Korea Fair Trade Commission, which dealt with 
reverse payment settlement agreements in a similar context. In order to 
achieve this, this part proceeds in the following order. First, subpart A 
discusses how the Actavis case will impact the courts in the United States. 
Subpart B provides the context for why Actavis is interesting and relevant 
to the current development of antitrust laws related to reverse payment 
settlement agreements in South Korea. In particular, subpart B(1) 
introduces South Korea’s proposed patent-approval linkage system, which 
will in effect introduce a regulatory framework similar to the Hatch–
Waxman Act in South Korea. Subpart B(2) analyzes the impact that the 
patent-approval linkage system will have on South Korea’s legal landscape. 
Subpart B(3) introduces and analyzes GlaxoSmithKline. Subpart B(4) 
provides a comparative analysis between Actavis and GlaxoSmithKline. 
Subpart B(5) delves into a deeper analysis of the GlaxoSmithKline case and 
its relevance to the laws and regulations pertinent to reverse payment 
settlement agreements in South Korea. Finally, subpart C will identify 
some of the lessons from a South Korean lawyer’s perspective that can be 
learned from the U.S. experience. 
 
A. Domestic Impact of the Rule of Reason Analysis. 
 
Because FTC v. Actavis is a recent decision, the Supreme Court’s 
holding that the rule of reason analysis applies has only been addressed in a 
limited number of lower court cases.125 Accordingly, an assessment of the 
 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. at 2237–38. 
 124  Id. at 2238. 
 125  Circuit courts have not yet directly addressed the issue of reverse payment settlement agreement. 
Only indirect references to the Actavis case are found among a few circuit court cases. For example, in a 
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U.S. domestic impact would be at best premature and speculative. 
However, a general discussion of the significance of the Court’s decision 
and its reasoning is necessary to set up the context for a comparative 
analysis with South Korean antitrust laws. 
Actavis settles what kind of legal scrutiny should be applied by the 
courts when analyzing the legality of reverse payment settlement 
agreements. Lower courts were previously split between the scope of the 
patent test and the rule of reason analysis. The Supreme Court now requires 
all courts to employ the traditional rule of reason analysis in these cases. 
Thus, reverse payment settlement agreements are no longer subject only to 
patent laws but to antitrust laws as well. 
Lower courts must now look to the traditional rule of reason analysis 
when addressing cases regarding reverse payment settlement agreements.126 
Under the traditional rule of reason analysis, “the factfinder weighs all of 
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should 
be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”127 
According to rule of reason case law, “[t]he plaintiff bears an initial burden 
of demonstrating that the alleged agreement produced adverse, 
anticompetitive effects within the relevant markets . . . .”128 Once the 
plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must prove that there are 
sufficient procompetitive justifications for the agreement.129 The agreement 
must be necessary or well-tailored to achieve the claimed efficiency 
justifications.130 Then, the burden again shifts to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive 
 
First Circuit class-action lawsuit, the court mentioned the Actavis holding but did not engage in the rule 
of reason analysis because the “merits of [the] plaintiffs’ antitrust challenge [were] not before [the 
court].” In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2015). A few federal district courts have 
applied the rule of reason analysis in their decisions on reverse payment settlement agreements. While 
these cases arose in the context of motion to dismiss or summary judgment litigations, they provide a 
glimpse of how courts may examine reverse payment settlement agreements in the future. For a brief 
discussion of these district court cases, see infra notes 126 and 136. 
 126  In a recent Pennsylvania federal district court case, the court held that “evidence of a large 
payment is required for a plaintiff to satisfy its initial burden of demonstrating anticompetitive effects 
under the Actavis rule of reason analysis.” King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., Nos. 2:06-cv-
1797, 2:06-cv-1833, 2:06-cv-2768, 2:08-cv-2141, 2015 WL 356913, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015) 
(citing Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 75 (3d Cir. 2010)). After the 
initial burden has been established, “whether or not the reverse payment is unjustified or unexplained is 
examined under the standard rule of reason burden-shifting framework, with the defendant bearing the 
burden of providing evidence that the reverse payment is justified by procompetitive considerations.” 
Id. at *11. Thereafter, “the plaintiff must . . . rebut those justifications and establish that the ‘restraint is 
not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective.’” Id.  
 127  Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
 128  Schering–Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 129  Id. 
 130  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents Okla. Univ., 468 U.S. 85, 116,116–20 (1984). 
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The effect of adopting the rule of reason for deciding reverse-
payment-settlement-agreement cases is that these agreements will be more 
difficult to sustain than under the scope of the patent test. The courts that 
had previously adopted the scope of the patent test can no longer dismiss 
the case and uphold the legality of suspicious agreements merely because 
there is no indication of a sham agreement and because the agreement 
appears to fall within the exclusionary potential of the patent.132 In the 
United States, then, the balance has shifted toward applying antitrust 
scrutiny in reverse-payment-settlement-agreement cases. 
Even though the Supreme Court said that the lower courts are to adopt 
their own level of scrutiny for the rule of reason analysis, it is unlikely that 
each circuit court’s version will vary significantly. This is because the 
Supreme Court throughout its opinion implicated what factors it considered 
significant in applying antitrust scrutiny. Toward the end of its opinion, the 
Court said that “the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about 
anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the 
pay[er’s] anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other 
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other 
convincing justification.”133 In determining whether the paying party will 
have market power to cause anticompetitive harm, the Court said that “the 
‘size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective 
generic is itself a strong indicator of [market] power.’”134 Regarding 
whether a result of patent litigation is needed to decide the antitrust issue, 
the Court pointed to “the size of the unexplained reverse payment” as a 
“workable surrogate.”135 
Given this context, the initial burden of proof borne by the 
competition agencies under the rule of reason analysis is unlikely to be 
taxing.136 Courts will likely accept an unreasonably large settlement 
 
 131  U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 132  The Supreme Court 2012 Term, Leading Cases, Federal Statutes and Regulations: Hatch-
Waxman Act — Reverse Payment Settlements — FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 127 HARV. L. REV. 358, 367 
(2013) (“Under a broad reading of Actavis, however, almost all settlement agreements between generics 
and developers could be subject to antitrust challenge . . .”). 
 133  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
 134  Id. at 2236. 
 135  Id. 
 136  A federal district court in California held that, in determining large, unjustified settlement 
amounts, “courts must be able to calculate [the] value [of unjustified payment]” and that nonmonetary 
payments, which can be calculated by “many plausible methods,” can be included in that amount. 
United Food & Com. Workers Local 1776 & Participating Employers Health & Welfare Fund v. 
Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., No. 14–md–02521–WHO 2014 WL 6465235, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 
2014) (citing In re Effexor XR., 2014 WL 4988410, at *23 and FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 
2236 (2013)). The court then examined the meaning of “large” and “unjustified” payment. Id. at *6–8. 
Large payments can be either “‘a sum even larger than what the generic would gain in profits if it won 
the paragraph IV litigation and entered the market’” at the one extreme and “anything more than the 
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amount as strong evidence of antitrust violation, and defendants will have 
to prove facts that justify the large sum payment or offer evidence of the 
procompetitive effects of the agreement. However, what level of excessive 
payment is unreasonable or what sort of procompetitive justifications the 
courts will accept will likely vary among the circuits. As was the case in 
the Actavis decision, the courts will carefully scrutinize the incentive 
structure of the participants, and this analysis will likely be fact intensive. 
For the competition agencies and defendants in an antitrust claim, 
proving the unreasonableness of the size of the settlement or disproving the 
justification for a settlement will be a paramount issue. For brand-name-
drug companies and generic-drug companies considering entering into 
reverse payment settlement agreements, how the courts will view their 
settlement amount and the potential justification they can provide for the 
terms of the settlement will influence their decision to include certain terms 
and monetary value in the settlement. 
Given the analysis above, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
Supreme Court has given a rather precise instruction when it ordered the 
circuit courts to apply the rule of reason analysis. Due to their rich case law 
on the rule of reason analysis, the courts in the United States will have a 
good framework under which they can apply the Supreme Court’s 
instructions in future reverse-payment-settlement cases. Would this be the 
same for Korean courts? With this understanding in mind, this Comment 
will now turn to how the Actavis decision may impact South Korea’s 
unique legal landscape in regard to reverse payment settlement agreements. 
 
B. Actavis and Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements in South 
Korea. 
 
The following subparts examine South Korea, a jurisdiction outside 
the United States where reverse payment settlement agreements could 
potentially arise as a controversial issue. As mentioned in the introduction, 
the issue of reverse payment settlement agreements is garnering significant 
attention among legal scholars and practitioners in South Korea because of 
two recent events: the adoption of the patent-approval linkage system and 
the recent decision of the South Korean Supreme Court on the 
GlaxoSmithKline case. The following subparts explore these two events in 
detail. 
 
value of the avoided litigation costs plus any other services provided from the generic to the brand 
manufacturer” at the other extreme. Id. at *13. Justified payments are “‘traditional settlement 
considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value for services.’” Id. The court acknowledged 
that the plaintiff there would be unable to establish whether the payment was justified because the case 
was only at the motion to dismiss stage. Instead, plaintiff’s allegation of large and unjustified payment 
was deemed plausible because of “the status of the underlying patent litigation—the first case was tried 
and submitted for a bench decision and the second case had proceeded past the pleading stage.” Id.  
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1. Introduction of the Patent-Approval Linkage System into Korean 
Pharmaceutical Laws 
 
On March 15, 2012, the United States and South Korea entered into a 
free trade agreement (FTA),137 in which the two countries agreed that South 
Korea would adopt a patent-approval linkage system.138 As one of the more 
important changes proposed under the FTA relevant to the pharmaceutical 
industry, the patent-approval linkage system would combine the patent 
system with the pharmaceutical approval process.139 Prior to the 
introduction of the linkage system, the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety 
(MFDS), when reviewing a drug application, would not consider whether 
there was an existing patent that the drug in the application might 
infringe.140 The result was that patent litigation often arose after the new 
drug had already been approved by the MFDS.141 
According to the changes proposed under the FTA, the MFDS drug 
application process will be linked to the patent process in a way similar to 
the ANDA process under the Hatch–Waxman Act.142 Article 18.9(5) of the 
FTA provides for the implementation of the patent-approval linkage system 
of both signatories of the FTA.143 According to the relevant provisions, 
 
 137  The U.S.—Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/FTA/korea/ 
index.asp (last updated Mar. 15, 2012, 2:46 PM). 
 138  Jeong Hwan, FTAwa uilyo jeyagsaneobui gyeongjaengbeob isyu [FTA and Competition Law 
Issues in the Healthcare Industry], 156 GYEONGJAENGJEONEOL [J. COMPETITION] 54, 55 (2011) (S. 
Kor.). 
 139  Jin Woo Hwang, Heogateugheo yeongyejedoui doibgwa gongjeonggeolaebeobui jeogyong [The 
Introduction of Approval–Patent Linkage System and the Application of Korea’s Monopoly Regulation 
and Fair Trade Act], 7 J. LAW & TECH. 5, 67–84 (2011) (S. Kor.). 
 140  Id. at 77. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Cho Young Sun & Jin Hyunsuk, Overview and Implication of the Drug Patent–Approval 
Linkage System in South Korean Regulation, PRACTICAL LAW, http://global.practicallaw.com/3-557-
9230# (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015, 9:30 PM). 
 143  U.S.–Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–S. Kor., art. 18.9(5), Mar. 15, 2012, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_ upload_file273_12717.pdf. 
The Agreement provides the following:  
Where a Party permits, as a condition of approving the marketing of a pharmaceutical 
product, persons, other than the person originally submitting safety or efficacy 
information, to rely on that information or on evidence of safety or efficacy information 
of a product that was previously approved, such as evidence of prior marketing approval 
in the territory of the Party or in another territory, that Party shall: (a) provide that the 
patent owner shall be notified of the identity of any such other person that requests 
marketing approval to enter the market during the term of a patent notified to the 
approving authority as covering that product or its approved method of use; and (b) 
implement measures in its marketing approval process to prevent such other persons 
from marketing a product without the consent or acquiescence of the patent owner during 
the term of a patent notified to the approving authority as covering that product or its 
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where a party—meaning the signatories of the FTA—permits the person 
applying for approval of the marketing of a pharmaceutical product to “rely 
on that information or on evidence of safety or efficacy information of a 
product that was previously approved,” it must do so under two 
conditions.144 First, the party must notify the patent owner “of the identity 
of any such other person that requests marketing approval to enter the 
market during the term of a patent” (the notification system).145 Second, the 
party must “implement measures in its marketing approval process to 
prevent such other persons from marketing a product without the consent or 
acquiescence of the patent owner during the term of [the] patent . . . .” (the 
marketing prevention system).146 Thus, the FTA essentially provides a 
mechanism that allows the generic-drug company to use the safety and 
efficacy information of an original-drug company to apply for its own 
approval, similar to the ANDA application in the United States. By 
requiring the original patent holder to be notified and by requiring the 
implementation of a marketing prevention system, the FTA requires Korea 
to link its patent system with its pharmaceutical drug approval system.  
The notification requirement went into effect immediately after the 
FTA went into force.147 Under the new notification system, the patent 
holder who received marketing approval “must file an application for 
registration in the Green List to the MFDS within 30 days from the date of 
the marketing approval.”148 If a generic-drug company files an application 
for a drug approval using the safety and efficacy information of a drug 
listed on the Green List, the applicant “must submit a document showing 
the relationship between the patent of the listed drug and the drug applied 
for approval.”149 The applicant then has to notify, within seven days from 
the date of application, “the person who obtained the original [drug] 
approval of the listed drug, and the patent holder.”150 
One difference between the notice systems of the United States and 
Korea is that in Korea the applicant is exempt from the notification 
requirement if the applicant has obtained a decision from the court or the 
Korean Intellectual Property Tribunal (KIPT) “that the patent of the listed 
drug is invalid, or the drug applied for approval is not within the scope of 
the patent rights of the listed drug.”151 This provision takes account of the 
 
approved method of use. 
Id. 
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Cho & Jin, supra note 142. 
 148  Id. The Green List is a list of existing patents linked to the drug approval system to alert the 
generics of an existing patent. Id. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
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fact that in South Korea a generic company can file a suit to determine the 
validity and scope of the patent “at any time with the KIPT . . . [even] 
before the patent holder initiates patent infringement litigation.”152 While in 
the United States the patent litigation suit is triggered with an ANDA IV 
certification, which brings the cost of patent litigation into the antitrust 
lawsuit, in Korea the patent litigation can be resolved prior to the generic’s 
application to enter the market. This means that the policy argument 
favoring settlement over the cost of litigation—which the Third Circuit 
accepted as a major factor for adopting the scope of the patent test—may 
not be an issue in cases where the patent infringement issue is resolved 
prior to the generic’s drug approval under the proposed rules in South 
Korea. 
Unlike the notification system that simultaneously went into effect 
with the FTA, the marketing prevention system is still in the making in 
South Korea. Pursuant to the FTA’s call to implement measures for the 
marketing prevention system, the MFDS announced on November 23, 
2013, “that it would prepare a unique patent-approval linkage system that 
takes into account the South Korean legal system and the characteristics of 
its pharmaceutical industry.”153 On March 21, 2014, the MFDS published a 
draft proposal for the amendment to the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, which 
included the proposed rules that set up the marketing prevention system.154 
The MFDS subsequently published an updated version of the draft proposal 
on July 25, 2014.155 
However, the updated proposal, expected to take effect on March 15, 
2015, after a period of public comments,156 bears a striking resemblance to 
the Hatch–Waxman Act. According to the proposed rules, a patent holder 
can apply for marketing prevention to the MFDS within forty-five days of 
receiving a notice from the generic-drug company of its application for 
marketing approval.157 The patent holder must, however, have filed a claim 
for “positive scope confirmation of patent rights with KIPT” or 
“prohibition of infringement with a court” prior to filing the application.158 
Two critical provisions in the draft proposal suggest the South Korean 
patent-approval linkage system generate a near-identical regulatory 
framework to that of the Hatch–Waxman Act. 
 
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. 
 154  Yaksabeob Ilbugaejungbeobyul(an) Ibbeobyego [Legislative Notice: Proposed Partial 
Amendment to the Pharmaceutical Law], Announcement of the Ministry of Food & Drug Safety No. 
2014–63, Mar. 21, 2014 (S. Kor.). 
 155  Yaksabeob Ilbugaejungbeobyul(an) Jaeibbeobyego [Legislative Re-Notice: Proposed Partial 
Amendment to the Pharmaceutical Law], Announcement of the Ministry of Food & Drug Safety No. 
2014–201, Jul. 25, 2014 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter Yaksabeob No. 2014–201]. 
 156  Cho & Jin, supra note 142. 
 157  Yaksabeob No. 2014–201, supra note 155, art. 50, § 8(1). 
 158  Id. 
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First, once the MFDS approves the application for marketing 
prevention, the generic-drug company is stayed from marketing its drug for 
up to twelve months from the date of application.159 While the Hatch–
Waxman Act provides an automatic stay period of thirty months, Korean 
experts in the field think that the decision to set the stay period at twelve 
months is “because it generally takes less than 12 months for the KIPT or a 
court to reach a conclusion on a patent dispute.”160 
Second, the proposal gives a one-year exclusive marketing right to 
applicants who: (1) first filed an application for marketing approval based 
on the safety and efficacy information of the patent holder and (2) 
prevailed in a patent litigation or administrative adjudication that was filed 
prior to the filing of the application for marketing approval.161 The 
marketing exclusivity period is longer than the 180-day period under the 
Hatch–Waxman Act. Korean experts attribute this to “the specific national 
circumstances, where hospitals typically decide to purchase drugs through 
yearly bidding; a shorter exclusive marketing period would render the 
exclusive marketing rights to become practically useless.”162 
Still, the proposal seems to take the concerns of reverse payment 
settlements into account. The proposed regulations provide that the 
marketing exclusivity terminates when the drug marketing is delayed for 
two months without reasonable justification.163 Termination of the 
exclusivity can also occur if the person who obtained the rights receives a 
judicial or an administrative decision to have violated any one of the three 
enumerated articles of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (Fair 
Trade Act), namely: “Prohibition of [the] Abuse of Market-Dominating 
Position,” (Article 3-2, § 1)164 “Prohibition of Unfair Collaborative Acts,” 
(Article 19, § 1)165 or “Prohibition of Unfair Trade Practices” (Article 23, 
§ 1).166 These conditions, under which the marketing exclusivity period 
terminates, appear to have been put in place to reduce the incentives of the 
patent holder to enter into a reverse payment settlement agreement because 
the patent holder can no longer exclude all generics from the market by 
paying off the first challenger. 
 
 
 159  Id. art. 50, § 9(3)(1). 
 160  Cho & Jin, supra note 142. 
 161  Yaksabeob No. 2014–201, supra note 154, art. 50, § 10(1). 
 162  Cho & Jin, supra note 142. 
 163  Id.; Yaksabeob No. 2014–201, supra note 154, art. 50, § 11(3). 
 164  Dokjeom gyuje mit gongjeong georaeae gwanhan beobyul [Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act], Act. No. 8666, Oct. 17 2007, art. 3, § 2 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research 
Institute online database, http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do (login and search required). 
 165  Id., art. 19, § 1. 
 166  Id., art. 23, § 1; Yaksabeob No. 2014–201, supra note 154, art. 50, § 11(1)(4). 
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2. Analysis of the Patent-Approval Linkage System’s Impact and 
Lessons Learned 
 
One of the questions raised in Part I was: Why is Korea adopting a 
patent–approval linkage system that mimics the Hatch–Waxman Act and 
thereby creating a similar incentive structure that accommodated reverse 
payment settlement agreements in the United States? Although there are 
many possible explanations,167 this may be a strategic choice by South 
Korean rule makers. The Hatch–Waxman Act and the amendment to the 
South Korean Pharmaceutical Law attempt to carefully balance the 
competing goals of patent laws and antitrust laws.168 While the policy 
makers want to encourage innovation of pioneering drug companies that 
develop new drugs, they also want to encourage generic-drug companies to 
enter the market and bring prices to competitive levels, especially when the 
patent is weak.169 
Because of the inherent conflict, it can be argued that the antitrust 
problems, including reverse payment settlement agreements, will appear in 
different forms no matter what the regulatory framework looks like.170 
Policy makers may attempt to draft detailed statutes and regulations that 
address all scenarios of antitrust harm, but there will always be the 
unknown or unintended consequence of the rules when the statutes and 
regulations are applied. As such, it may have made sense for Korean policy 
makers to borrow a working patent-approval linkage system from a country 
that has the longest and most extensive legislative and judicial experience 
and, from there, to make specific adjustments to those provisions that 
appear to encourage reverse payment settlement agreements. Also, because 
the patent–approval linkage system was birthed out of the U.S.–Korea 
FTA, it may have made sense to adopt a system that is the most compatible 
between the two countries. 
This in fact may explain what had happened with the most recent draft 
proposal amendments to the Korean Pharmaceutical Law. The proposal 
includes all the nuts and bolts that make the patent-approval linkage system 
work as well as incentives for generics to enter the market, including the 
 
 167  Other possible explanations include that the adoption was a result of U.S. diplomatic pressure or 
internal pressure by lobbyists that represent the interest of multinational pharmaceutical corporations. 
 168  The Supreme Court 2012 Term Leading Cases: Hatch–Waxman Act—Reverse Payment 
Settlement Agreements—FTC v. Actavis, Inc, supra note 132, at 365 (“[T]he Hatch–Waxman Act, after 
all, was an act of compromise intended to strike an appropriate balance by providing stronger 
protections for the developers of legitimately novel drugs while incentivizing generic manufacturers to 
challenge weak patent claims. It does not clearly resolve the issues raised by the intersection of patent 
and antitrust.”). 
 169  Id. 
 170  See generally Thomas A. Faunce & Joel Lexchin, ‘Linkage’ Pharmaceutical Evergreening in 
Canada and Australia, 4 AUSTL. & N.Z. HEALTH POL. 8 (2007), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1894804/. 
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notice system, the marketing prevention system, and the exclusive 
marketing period. At the same time, those provisions that incentivize 
reverse payment settlement agreements—like the 180-day exclusive 
marketing period of the Hatch–Waxman Act—have been imported, albeit 
modified, so that incentives for entering into reverse payment settlement 
agreements are mitigated. 
Second, although it remains to be seen how the new regulations will 
work out in South Korea, if they are successful at preventing or reducing 
the occurrence of anticompetitive reverse payment settlement agreements, 
then the rules may provide a viable model for the United States. This is 
especially true because the American rules were very closely adopted by 
South Korea.171 While the United States has attempted to address reverse 
payment settlements through the judiciary system, the successful outcome 
of Korea’s rules may persuade the United States to amend its own statutes 
and regulations as an alternative method for tackling the issue of reverse 
payment agreements. Still, as was the case in the United States, the South 
Korean statutory framework that attempted to bridge the conflicting goals 
of patent law and antitrust law resulted in the judiciary trying to resolve the 
intricate issues raised in reverse payment settlement agreements. 
 
3. GSK v. KFTC Pharmaceutical: A Mixed Decision 
 
The second event that triggered considerable interest among antitrust 
scholars in South Korea was the case involving a patent settlement 
agreement between GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Dong-A Pharmaceuticals 
(Dong-A), which climbed all the way to the Supreme Court of the Republic 
of Korea and was ultimately decided on February 27, 2014.172 The Supreme 
Court’s opinion was relatively short, affirming most of the issues that were 
appealed from the Seoul High Court, which had issued its decision on 
October 11, 2012.173 The Seoul High Court’s opinion included an extensive 
analysis on the issue of the applicability of antitrust laws to the agreement 
that settled the patent dispute between GSK and Dong-A. The facts of the 
case are provided here in detail to help understand the issue at hand. 
In 1985, GSK developed Ondansetron, an innovative antiemetic agent 
for which it submitted a patent application in South Korea in 1985 and 
received approval in 1992.174 Following a new drug approval by the MFDS 
in 1996, GSK marketed Ondansetron under the brand name Zofran.175 In 
 
 171  Cho & Jin, supra note 142. 
 172  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Du24498, Feb. 27, 2014 (S. Kor.). 
 173  Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2012Nu3028, Oct. 11, 2012 (S. Kor.). 
 174  Chul Ho Kim & Jin Woo Hwang, Yeogjigeub habuie daehan migug EU mich hangugui 
choegeun gyeoljeong [Recent Decisions in the United States, Europe and Korea Regarding Reverse 
Payment Agreement], 9–5 J. L. & TECH. 44, 53 (2013). 
 175  Id. 
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2000, GSK’s market share of antiemetic drugs was 47%.176 In 1999, Dong-
A obtained a patent of its own version of Ondansetron, which it was able to 
produce using two different production methods.177 Following a new drug 
approval by the MFDS, Dong-A marketed Ondaron, the generic version of 
Zofran, in South Korea starting in September 1998.178 GSK filed a patent 
infringement suit in the Seoul District Court in October 1999, but on April 
17, 2000, the two companies entered into three agreements: (1) a marketing 
and supply contract for Ondansetron; (2) an exclusive marketing and 
supply contract for Valtrex; and (3) a compromise contract.179 
According to the Compromise Contract, Dong-A agreed to cease the 
production and sales of Ondaron for five years and GSK agreed to 
withdraw the patent infringement litigation.180 The five years included a 
short period at the end when GSK’s patent was set to expire.181 This 
contract was subsequently extended for another five years at which point 
GSK’s patent had already expired.182 Under the marketing and supply 
contracts, GSK granted Dong-A the marketing rights to Zofran in national 
and public hospitals in South Korea and the exclusive marketing rights to 
Valtrex, which was a new drug that had not yet entered the market.183 In 
return, Dong-A promised not to develop, produce, or market drugs that 
were identical or similar to Zofran or Valtrex.184 
As a result of these agreements, the Korea Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) determined that the two companies were in violation of Article 19 
of the Fair Trade Act, which prohibits unfair collaborative acts, including 
“[l]imiting the area in which a transaction arises or the transaction 
counterpart” and “[p]ractically restricting competition in a particular 
business area by means of interfering or restricting the activities or contents 
of business by other enterprisers (including the enterpriser who has 
conducted the activity).”185 The KFTC ordered the parties to take corrective 
measures and imposed a total fine of 5.17 billion Korean Won 
(approximately $4.59 million USD).186 
GSK and Dong-A each appealed KFTC’s decision to the Seoul High 
 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. at 53–54. 
 178  Id. at 54. 
 179  Id. 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. 
 182  Id. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. 
 185  Dokjeom gyuje mit gongjeong georaeae gwanhan beobyul [Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act], Act. No. 8666, Oct. 17 2007, art. 19, § 1(4), (9) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation 
Research Institute online database, http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_ service/main.do (login and search 
required). 
 186  Kim & Hwang, supra note 174, at 54. 
4KIM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15 1:45 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:377 (2015) 
404 
Court.187 The court rendered a separate decision for each appellant. In the 
GSK appeal, the court first determined that Korea’s Fair Trade Act applies 
to restrictive conduct that falls outside the legitimate scope of the patent.188 
Applied to the case at hand, the court looked at the following facts about 
the compromise contract to determine whether the restrictive conduct fell 
outside the scope of the patent: (1) whether the agreement restricted the 
production and marketing of Ondaron to the period after the expiration of 
the patent; (2) whether the agreement restricted production of Ondansetron 
even when produced with methods not covered by the patent; and (3) 
whether the agreement restricted production and sales of Valtrex which had 
nothing to do with the patent at issue.189 Because GSK gave economic 
benefits to Dong-A that were beyond the normal level, KFTC inferred 
intent of collusion between GSK and Dong-A and determined that the 
agreement was outside the scope of the patent and, therefore, within the 
purview of the Fair Trade Act.190 
The court further found the agreement’s restriction of sales and 
marketing beyond the patent validity period to be in violation of Article 19, 
§§ (1) and (4) of the Fair Trade Act.191 In addition, the provision in the 
compromise contract that restricted the development and production of 
other drugs in potential competition with Zofran or Valtrex was ruled 
unreasonably restrictive.192 For these reasons, GSK’s appeal was 
dismissed.193 
Regarding Dong-A’s appeal, the Seoul High Court ruled similarly to 
that of the GSK decision. One notable difference was that the agreement 
regarding Valtrex was deemed a separate issue under unjust concerted 
practices because the use, effect, and market for Valtrex were different 
from those of Zofran.194 Since the KFTC did not raise a claim regarding 
this separate coordinated action, the court reversed the corrective order and 
fines related to Valtrex.195 The remaining points of the appeal were 
dismissed.196 
Both GSK and Dong-A appealed the decisions of the Seoul High 
Court to the Supreme Court of Korea.197 As of today, the Supreme Court 
has decided on GSK’s appeal, affirming the applicability of antitrust laws 
 
 187  Id. 
 188  Id. 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. at 55. 
 191  Id. 
 192  Id. 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. 
 195  Id. 
 196  Id. 
 197  Id. at 57. 
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to the settlement agreement at issue.198 Interestingly, the court also 
suggested its stance on reverse payment settlement agreements.199 
The court then expressed the following opinion on this situation. First, 
whether the agreement is ‘not a legitimate exercise of rights under the 
patent act’ must be determined on a case-by-case basis according to 
whether the patent holder affected fair and free competition through an 
agreement where it maintains its monopoly status by providing a portion of 
its monopoly profit to its counterpart of the agreement.”200 
Second, in order to determine the foregoing, “the court must 
comprehensively consider how the agreement was reached, the content of 
the agreement, the period of the agreement, size of the economic benefit 
given for the agreement, cost of patent litigation and projected 
recuperation, and the existence of other reasons that legitimize the price of 
the agreement.”201 This portion of the Korean Supreme Court’s opinion is 
arguably the first impression of the Court’s experience with reverse 
payment settlement agreements and thus deserves attention. Further 
analysis on this opinion will be provided in this comment after a 
comparative analysis between this case and Actavis. 
 
4. Case Comparison: GSK v. Dong-A and Actavis 
 
Comparing GSK to Actavis is tricky because, while there are 
significant similarities between Actavis and the GSK decision, but there is 
also a key difference that suggests that GSK did not address the issue of 
reverse payment settlement agreements at all. On the similarities first, both 
cases involved an agreement between an original-drug company and a 
generic-drug company in which the original-drug company offered 
substantial economic benefits to the generic-drug company in return for the 
generic-drug company’s promise to stay out of the original-drug company’s 
patented drug market. GSK’s offer of economic benefits to Dong-A was 
counterintuitive because normally one would expect the party that infringes 
the patent to pay the penalty to the patent holder. Here, the direction of the 
payment was reversed, so the agreements in both cases bear a key 
characteristic of a reverse payment settlement agreement. 
 
 198  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Du24498, Feb. 27, 2014 (S. Kor.). 
 199  Id. (The court described the situation upon which its opinion applied as follows: “This is a 
situation where a patent holder of a pharmaceutical drug, in the course of attempting to manufacture and 
sell its drug that can potentially to be infringed upon by a third party, agrees to provide certain 
economic benefits to a third party who contends the efficacy or the scope of the rights of the patent, and 
in return, receives consent to resolve or delay the patent dispute.” Korean court opinions are notorious 
for their long, compounded sentences. For the sake of preserving the integrity of the original text, the 
text within the above quotation is an almost literal translation of the court’s opinion.). 
 200  Id. 
 201  Id. 
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Second, the out-of-the-ordinary level of economic benefit that the 
original-drug company paid to the generic-drug company was an important 
factor to both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Korean courts. In FTC v. 
Actavis, the Court said that “the ‘size of the payment from a branded drug 
manufacturer to a generic challenger is a strong indicator of such 
power.”202 Because such a sizeable payment indicated market power, the 
Court deemed this as one of the reasons that the costly antitrust scrutiny 
associated with a rule of reason analysis was worth the price.203 Similarly, 
in both the Seoul High Court’s and Korean Supreme Court’s decisions, the 
court inferred intent of collusion from the fact that the economic benefit 
conferred by GSK to Dong-A was larger than what one would expect in a 
normal transaction. It was for this reason that the Fair Trade Act was 
implicated. 
Third, in both cases, the tension between the scope of the patent and 
the applicability of antitrust laws was an important step in determining the 
final outcome of the case. In GSK, the court first determined whether the 
GSK–Dong-A agreement was a legitimate exercise of power conferred to 
GSK within the scope of the relevant patent.204 Because the court 
determined that the agreement fell outside the scope of GSK’s patent, the 
court proceeded to further analyze whether the agreement violated the Fair 
Trade Act.205 In Actavis, the Supreme Court established as the first step of 
its analysis that the agreement between Actavis and Solvay was within 
“‘the exclusionary potential of the patent.’”206 The Court then determined 
that regardless of that fact the agreement must undergo antitrust scrutiny.207 
According to some Korean practitioners, however, GSK does not 
precisely deal with the same legal issue as Actavis because of one factual 
difference. In GSK, the settlement’s restriction on Dong-A’s marketing of 
its generic drug included the time beyond the patent’s expiration date.208 
Thus, judging whether the value of antitrust policy outweighs the value of 
the patent or the settlement does not arise because the agreement between 
GSK and Dong-A fell outside the scope of the legitimate exclusionary 
power of its patent. Because the restriction applied beyond the patent’s 
validity period, it was obvious that antitrust laws were implicated in that 
case. On the other hand, the Actavis court rigorously analyzed whether the 
antitrust laws should be applied. Unlike the GSK case, the agreement 
between Actavis and Solvay addressed a timeframe within the period when 
 
 202  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013). 
 203  Id. 
 204  Kim & Hwang, supra note 174, at 56. 
 205  Id. 
 206  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2230. 
 207  Id. 
 208  Kim & Hwang, supra note 174, at 56. 
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Actavis’s patent was still valid.209 Thus, the determination whether to apply 
antitrust law in that case was subject to the tension between the 
exclusionary potential of a patent and precompetitive goals of antitrust 
laws. With these similarities and differences in mind, we now return to a 
fuller analysis of the GSK case and its significance in analyzing the Korean 
court’s disposition of reverse payment settlement agreements in Korea. 
 
5. Further Analysis of the GSK Case and Its Relevance to Reverse 
Payment Settlement Agreements 
 
Based on the text of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Korea, one 
may get the impression that the court is confounding the scope of the patent 
test with an analysis that is similar to the rule of reason analysis. Based on 
the reasoning used by the Seoul High Court, the GSK case should have 
been fairly easy to decide.210 The mere fact that the agreement extended 
beyond the patent validity period indicated that the agreement was outside 
the scope of the patent. Thus, at that point the court could have just 
dismissed the patent issue and applied the antitrust laws. Applying the 
antitrust laws, the court decision should have been a simple application of 
Article 19’s prohibition of unjust concerted practices, which restricts 
agreements that “[p]ractically restrict[] competition.”211 
However, the GSK case appears to engage in policy analysis that 
resembles the reasoning used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Actavis. For 
example, the Supreme Court of Korea listed factors such as “the size of the 
economic benefit given for the agreement, cost of patent litigation and 
projected recuperation, and the existence of other reasons that legitimize 
the price of the agreement” that must be “comprehensively considered.”212 
These were almost identical to the factors considered by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Actavis decision in adopting the rule of reason. The Supreme Court 
of Korea also opined that whether the agreement in question affects 
competition must be determined on a case-by-case basis.213 Along with the 
court’s order to “comprehensively consider” the above-mentioned factors, 
this case-by-case examination also resembles the methodology used in the 
rule of reason of U.S. courts. 
The fact that the Korean Supreme Court appeared to import this line 
of legal reasoning seems odd because in its opinion it clearly mentioned 
that the reverse payment settlement extended beyond the validity period of 
 
 209  Id. 
 210  Id. 
 211  Dokjeom gyuje mit gongjeong georaeae gwanhan beobyul [Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act], Act. No. 8666, Oct. 17 2007, art. 19 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research 
Institute online database, http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do (login and search required). 
 212  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Du24498, Feb. 27, 2014 (S. Kor.). 
 213  Id. 
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the underlying patent. Why would the court use the reasoning fit for 
resolving reverse payment settlement agreements under the rule of reason 
when it pointed out facts that clearly indicated that the agreement extended 
beyond the exclusionary power of the patent? 
One explanation may be found in the characteristic of Korean judicial 
opinions. According to one Korean legal scholar, while Korean legal 
opinions show strength in the choice of applicable laws, identifying 
relevant facts, and applying the laws to the facts, they are generally weak in 
developing legal standards for application in future cases.214 The reason for 
this is that Korea is a civil law country with a legal system modeled after 
continental law.215 Thus, unlike in a Common Law system, judges’ 
decisions are not binding in South Korea.216 Under the civil law regime, 
South Korean judges apply the facts to the statutes and regulations 
promulgated by the legislature.217 Thus, the various factors considered in 
the court’s decision—like the unreasonably excessive settlement amount—
may simply be one of the facts, rather than an element of the law, that the 
Korean Supreme Court recited when applying the relevant facts to the 
provisions in the Fair Trade Act. Thus, a plausible explanation is that the 
Korean Supreme Court arrived at its decision independently of U.S. case 
law. 
However, if the court in this case had access to the U.S. opinions on 
reverse payment settlement agreements, it may have incorporated parts of 
the U.S. court’s analysis into its decision in the absence of the binding 
precedents which were present in the Actavis case. Unlike the United 
States, South Korea does not have the extensive case law under which the 
rule of reason analysis was developed. Without such background, the 
Korean court may have incorporated some of the reasoning of U.S. 
decisions without having the obligation to consider the fine distinction 
between the scope of the patent test and the rule of reason analysis. 
Therefore, while the Korean Supreme Court used the language to 
comprehensively consider various factors similar to those appearing in the 
Actavis rule of reason analysis, such similarity may well be a coincidence 
derived from independent legal analysis by the two courts. Because both 
cases present similar sets of facts under a similar regulatory structure, it 
may not be too surprising that judges from different legal systems arrive at 
similar outcomes. 
 
 214  Jin-suk Byun, Sabeobminjujuuiwa beobwonui pangyeolmun [Judicial Democracy and Case 
Opinions of Courts], 12–0 ILGAMBEOBHAG [ILKAM L. REV.] 241, 251–52 (2013) (S. Kor.). 
 215  Eun Young Lee, Hangug minbeobui byeoncheon [Five Decades of Korean Civil Code: Its 
Formation and Transition], 9–0 HANGUGMUNHWAYEONGU [KOR. CULTURE RESEARCH] 175, 177 
(2005). 
 216  Byun, supra note 214, at 244–45 (stating that although Korea does not have stare decisis, 
Korean courts nonetheless take similar previous cases “into consideration”). 
 217  Id. at 251. 
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Whatever the reason for the similarity of the two opinions, the GSK 
decision is an example of how the Korean courts may decide a future case 
that will accurately represent the issue of reverse payment settlement 
agreements. For example, the GSK case indicates that Korean courts may 
be open to studying and borrowing the reasoning of U.S. case law. If this is 
the case, it will not be surprising for the Korean Supreme Court to 
implement a similar line of reasoning when an actual reverse payment 
settlement agreement comes before the court. Similarly, while the Korean 
cases may not specifically distinguish the scope of the patent test from the 
rule of reason analysis, because Korean judges operate under a civil law 
system, practitioners can expect Korean courts will take a comprehensive 
approach and weigh the various competing factors when deliberating 
reverse payment settlement agreements. 
 
C. What Korea Can Learn from the U.S. Experience. 
 
The reasoning adopted by Actavis as well as the rich case law 
spanning over twelve years provide a valuable jurisprudential tool in 
dealing with questionable settlements between brand-name- and generic-
drug companies in Korea. Because GSK did not directly address a reverse 
payment settlement issue, one may be tempted to conclude that Actavis and 
the relevant U.S. case law will have little influence on Korean anti-
competition laws. However, if the recently proposed amendments to 
Korea’s Pharmaceutical Laws come into effect, similar incentive structures 
that fostered reverse payment settlements in the United States may be 
created in Korea. If so, the question of the applicability of antitrust laws in 
cases where the reverse payment settlement agreements are within the 
exclusionary scope of the patent could become relevant. Under this 
scenario, the reasoning in FTC v. Actavis, which advocated the rule of 
reason test, may be useful for antitrust authorities and courts in South 
Korea. 
One could argue that the Actavis decision is only relevant to the 
United States because the issue arises in the context of the Hatch–Waxman 
Act’s unique ANDA procedure and because the reasoning and holding are 
a culmination of decades of U.S. antitrust case law. However, the Actavis 
decision has potential to have influence beyond the United States courts. 
This is because the Actavis decision contains the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
sophisticated reasoning on whether antitrust analysis is relevant when an 
agreement that potentially restricts competition falls within the scope of a 
patent of one of the parties. It also showcases the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
attempt at balancing the policy interests of the patent laws and antitrust 
laws. These issues will recur regardless of the specific legal structure or 
statutory framework adopted by different jurisdictions. And for these 
issues, U.S. case law and the Actavis opinion present a powerful analytic 
4KIM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15 1:45 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:377 (2015) 
410 
arsenal for other jurisdictions to use, including South Korea. Several 
important lessons come to mind. 
For one, the U.S. experience with the per se rule, scope of the patent 
test, and rule of reason analysis applied by the different circuit courts 
provides the reasoning used for adopting the respective rules as well as 
their advantages and disadvantages. The U.S. courts also engaged in 
economic analyses to determine the reasonableness of a payment amount 
measured against the parties’ incentives and the cost of litigation, which 
may provide empirical data to Korean courts.218 In addition, the U.S. courts 
have experimented with different procedural rules and allocations of the 
burden of proof under the scope of the patent test and the rule of reason 
analysis; such exercise has exposed the relative efficiencies and problems 
of each procedural approach.219 These are just a few of the judicial 
experiences that the U.S. case law presents to the rest of the world. 
For this reason, Actavis is an important decision for the lawyers, 
regulators, private companies in Korea, and other jurisdictions around the 
world. For countries like South Korea where there is a realistic prospect of 
the introduction of a statutory framework that creates similar incentive 
structures to the United States, Actavis and the preceding cases among 




This Comment has sought to analyze the recent Supreme Court 
decision FTC v. Actavis and offer a comparative perspective on the legal 
issue of reverse payment settlement agreements as they arise in the United 
States and South Korea. For the courts in the United States, the assessment 
of this case’s impact is still premature. Perhaps in a few years when a 
number of district courts and circuit courts have addressed the issue, 
another commentator may assess the impact. 
In Korea, reverse payment settlement agreements will likely become a 
central legal issue in the pharmaceutical industry and in the intersection 
between antitrust and patent laws.220 The introduction of the patent-
approval linkage system may create a regulatory framework similar to the 
Hatch–Waxman Act in Korea and thereby replicate an incentive structure 
that fosters reverse payment settlement agreements. I argued that Korean 
policy makers strategically imported the Hatch–Waxman’s regulatory 
framework almost intact because they took into account the advanced 
 
 218  See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 219  See supra Part III(A). 
 220  Keum Nang Park, Hui Jin Yang & Eunkyoung Lyu, Ip in the Life Science Industries 2014: South 
Korea’s Patent-Approval Linkage System, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (IAM) MAG. July–Aug. 2014, at 121, 
124, available at http://www.iam-magazine.com/Magazine/Issue/ 66/Management-report/South-
Koreas-Patent-Approval-Linkage-System. 
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standing of U.S. laws and the inherent conflicting goals present in the 
regulatory framework. Although Korea has modified some provisions to 
prevent or reduce the incentives for reverse payment settlements, their 
efficacy remains to be seen. 
The GSK decision was puzzling because it appeared to confound the 
scope of the patent test with the rule of reason analysis. Such a result, 
however, most likely extends from independent decisions by two courts 
that operate under two distinct legal systems. The GSK case is important 
because it provides a glimpse of how future cases on reverse payment 
settlements in Korea may look. Lastly, the Actavis case and other relevant 
U.S. case law provide rich analytic tools for Korean courts to look into 
when they decide cases on this issue. For these reasons, courts, regulatory 
agencies, lawyers, businesses, and scholars in South Korea will find it 
beneficial to pay close attention to Actavis and the subsequent development 
of case law in the United States. 
 
